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Just as the mainstream established Christian religions in Australia decline at 
various rates and in various ways, new religious groups flourish. The variety of 
these groups is astonishing, to many disconcerting. They include not only the New 
Religious Movements that burst on the scene from the 1960s to the 1980s- the likes 
of the Church of Scientology, the Hare Krishnas, the Moonies - but at least five other 
types of new groups. These are: New immigrant and ethnic community (NIEC) 
religions; New Christian conversionist groups, especially Pentecostals; and 
overlapping these New fundamentalist or charismatic groups within Catholicism, 
Judaism and Islam; New cults, centred around therapies and/or gurus and /or 
celebrities and/or ritual practices; and overlapping these New Age spirituality 
networks. 
Now these types, as suggested by my nervous phrase, 'overlapping these', are 
not good classifiers: each type is internally diverse, and placement of particular 
groups in one type is often going to be problematic. All of which underlines the 
simple point I'm making with the list: that increasing diversity or pluralism is one 
of the key features of the contemporary religious scene in Australia - not secularisation, 
not scandal, but increasing diversity. 
In this paper I want to explore answers to some questions about the social and 
political significance and consequences of increasing religious diversity in Australia. 
The big questions are: What sort of Australian society is signified in increasing 
religious diversity? What sort of emergent Australian society is being constructed 
as religiously based values, and religiously grounded civic cultures become more 
diverse? Do we have cause to worry that increasing religious diversity in itself, or 
because of some of its constituent elements, threatens our national society? Or, putting 
it in terms of our theme, is there a diversity that needs to be managed because 
increasing religious diversity is both a sign and potential cause of the disintegration 
of Australian national society? As we shall see, we don't get very far until we break 
the big questions down into questions we can put to discussible evidence. But for a 
while I want to stay with the big questions. 
Americans, more habitually than we, ask questions about the state of the Union, 
and put religious factors into their answers. I propose to outline some American 
responses to questions like mine to provide a sort of framework for my Australian 
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enquiry. Full advantage will be taken of the political scientist William E. Connolly's 
work, particularly his essay Fundamentalism in America (Connolly 1995). Connolly 
quotes James Kurth's lament about the decline of the U.S.A. as a nation state (1992)1 
as exemplifying a line of analysis of the state of the union with which he begs to 
differ. A refrain in the analysis is that the U.S.A., since the 1960s, 'has steadily 
become less a nation and more a multicultural society': note that opposition. As 
Kurth sees it, the U.S.A. entered the twentieth century as one of the few modem 
nation states, along with Britain, France, Germany Italy and Japan. These modem 
nation states organised and coordinated the cultural, security, and economic aspects 
of life in the great industrial societies of the day, channelling resources to the key 
institutions of the school, the army and the factory, and at the same time, channelling 
and integrating the output of these institutions to advancement of a clearly defined, 
consensual national interest. In the case of the U.S.A., by the end of the century, the 
sources of consensual value have been lost and the disintegration of the nation state 
is so far advanced that only a sort of cultural war against the internal and external 
forces undermining consensual value and national industrial production could restore 
the nation state, which is worth restoring, in Kurth's view, because it is the highest 
and best form of human society. 
The new religious groups that I have listed enter the scene of decline and fall, 
but not as a bloc, except in the senses that the increasing religious diversity they 
constitute may be read as a sign of evaporating value consensus, accompanying the 
decline of those mainstream Christian denominations which are supposed to have 
helped shape consciences and dispositions of the good workers and citizens of 
industrial society. But, as Connolly points out, Kurth's sort of secular academic 
lament about the death of the modem industrial nation state is in tune with laments 
heard in at least one of the listed new religious groups - the 'new' Christian 
conversionist groups which claim to articulate the one, true and American Christian 
culture, and like Kurth, decry the other new religious groups as part of corrupting, 
creeping multiculturalism, destructive of American society2• 
It is as harbingers and producers of multiculturalism that all the other listed 
new religious groups are bunched as enemies of national society .. That basic dichotomy, 
multicultural society vs. nation subsumes others, in which the terms on both sides of 
the dichotomy are seen as linked such that each is cause and effect of the others. 
Consider the lists in columns 1 and 2 in the table on the following page. 
I don't want to go into all the interesting issues that the above diagram suggests 
- not the least of which is whether the U.S. national state with all those interacting 
characteristics ever existed, and if it did, whether a sort of sacred canopy of Judea-
Christian ethics and beliefs (with the Judeo added rather late in the piece!) held it 
together. Rather I want to use the American case and debates about the consequences 
of increasing religious diversity in U.S. national society to help define the issues 
concerning increasing religious diversity in Australia. Is it the case that the groups 
constituting increasing religious diversity, singly or collectively, take their place as 
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Column 1: Multicultural Society Column 2: Nation 
Increasing religious diversity Unifying (Judeo-) Christian culture 
Social fragmentation, multicultural regime Organisation of organisations 
Non-citizens Citizens trained in civility 
Post-modernism Modernity 
Deconstruction Reconstruction of nation 
Poor education, high illiteracy Canonical literacy 
Weak service economy Industrial economy 
Mass entertainment High culture (recognised as such) 
Military insecurity Large military establishment 
Lack of capable leaders A unified pool of leaders 
USA joins ranks of 'takers of history'. USA was a maker of history 
causes and effects of other items in column 1 (modified, of course to bear more 
semblance to the Australian case), and conversely, as subverters of the interacting 
items in column 2? Or, following some of Connolly's lines of argument about 
increasing cultural diversity in the U.S. might at least some elements in Australia's 
diversifying religions be making a positive contribution to the development of a new 
type of national society in which new principles of social solidarity, based on the 
disposition and the capacity to negotiate difference operate? 
Connolly's work invites us to abandon lament for the passing of the sort of 
democracy which allowed a people to rule themselves despite difference of interest 
because they were united by shared religiously-based beliefs and values. Instead, we 
might first discern and then nurture a deeper, emergent form of democracy in which 
the constituents of a religiously, politically and ethnically multicultural order have a 
hand in the mediation of their own differences. Elaborating a little on Connolly, we 
might imagine an already emergent Australian society in which diverse religions 
dispose, equip and empower members to engage in the negotiation of different 
imagined futures, values and lifestyles - and, in those negotiations, actually perform 
a vital Australian democracy. 
In the rest of this paper I want to set out in search of this supposed emergent 
Australian society in which religious diversity provides a foundation for democracy. 
This search requires, first of all, some refinement of conceptual tools to aid 
discernment. We need to rehearse the concepts that help us spell out the profound 
changes in political agendas and modes of political engagement that have occurred 
in advanced national societies over the last thirty years. We need to specify what 
sorts of religious belief, practice and organization might have the capacity to dispose 
and enable individuals and groups to engage in the democratic negotiation of 
differences. In addition to this consideration of types of religion we need to assemble 
the various Australias-in-the-making, of which a deeply democratic multicultural 
Australia is only one. And then, in conjunction with conceptual exploration, we 
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must do systematically what is attempted only piecemeal and sporadically here: 
consider the evidence about the religions, how they figure in the lives of their members 
and how they operate in the wider society. 
Contextualising and Profiling the New Religions 
As an aid to imagining the new Australia of democratically negotiated 
difference, it may help to rehearse some ideas and concepts that have developed as 
sociologists have tried to describe and understand the structures and dynamics of 
advanced national societies at the end of the twentieth century. These include five 
propositions which, together, challenge us to think beyond the simple either/or 
possibilities entertained by Kurth. 
1. We are indeed moving away from the form of modern society conceptualised 
as a system of roles scripted in institutions regulated and coordinated by the 
"organization of organizations", viz. the state, which also mediates the central class 
conflicts of the society. But we are not moving towards inevitable disintegration and 
collapse. Rather, there are signs of new forms of solidarity, coordination, conflict 
and mediation as well as new modes of societal transformation. National societies, 
while retaining features encoded in the concepts of role, institutions, state, and class 
conflict, are becoming also societies of competing collective identities, formed in 
and contesting the future through social movements which operate in and on civil 
society as well as in the arenas of formal politics (Scott, 1990, Giddens, 1994). At 
the same time, social movements orientate their operations less and less to local 
community and national society and more and more to personal networks and the 
emerging global network society (Castells 1996). 
2. Under the combined impact of globalizing capitalism and the information 
technology revolution, individuals in advanced prosperous societies are forced to 
negotiate lifestyle choices and choices about the source of meaning and experience 
(i.e. social identity) among a diversity of options (Giddens 1994, Castells 1997). 
Included in this diversity are traditional and new religious identities and lifestyles, 
ethnic-, gender-, and environmental-focussed identities and lifestyles, but also 
identities and lifestyles formed in and around the great administrative structures of 
the national economy and the polity on the one hand and, on the other, the emerging 
structures of the global network society. In such societies, negotiation of lifestyle 
and identity becomes more salient and more important to an ever-increasing 
proportion of citizens than the learning and monitoring of set social roles policed 
and modelled by agencies of the nation-state, established churches and local as 
opposed to transnational social elites. 
3. The negotiation of lifestyle and identity is not only a concern of individuals. 
Such choices are negotiated collectively, and identities and lifestyles are developed, 
modified and defended in the interactions of identity politics. Social movements, 
and religious groups encouraging the open negotiation of identity contribute to a 
"dialogic democracy" of identity politics insofar as they insert "into the discursive 
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domain aspects of social conduct that previously went undiscussed, or were 'settled' 
by traditional practices" (Giddens 1994: 120). 
4. Identity politics increasingly becomes the sphere of action in which whole 
societies, including the emergent global network society, constitute and transform 
themselves. (Castells 1997). 
5. Effective engagement in identity politics requires of the groups, associations 
and movements (national and transnational) involved that they foster orientations 
and dispositions to collective action for the development and defence of identity and 
lifestyle; that they equip and empower constituents for the hard slog of sustained 
contest and negotiation (identity politics, no less than formal interest politics is, in 
Max Weber's words, a "slow boring through thick boards"); that while providing 
community for the formation of identity, they also provide connection to the sites 
and means of negotiation and contest especially the media (Castells 1984). Groups, 
associations, and movements vary enormously in the orientations to collective action 
that they foster, and also in their capacity to empower and connect. The factors 
affecting this variation we might call the societal profile of a particular group, 
association or movement. In the case of religion, the societal profile of a religious 
group or association refers to the set of characteristics that affect, positively or 
negatively, collective and individual dispositions and capacities to engage effectively 
in dialogic, democratic identity politics. 
This paper seeks to outline and discuss the societal profiles of religious entities 
contributing to increasing religious diversity in multicultural Australia. Particular 
focus is on the new religious movements, the New Age spirituality networks and 
some new cults - precisely the religious phenomena that are suspected of subverting 
identity politics as well as the integrity of national societies. These are the religions 
that are supposed variously to foster narcissistic, anti-social identities (Lasch 1980); 
to foster brittle, affect-based relationships (of the kind described by Hetherington 
1992) rather than communal relationships (with characteristics posited by Milbank 
1996) capable of sustaining the engagements of identity politics; to orientate devotees 
to other worldly concerns rather than this-worldly endeavour; to disempower 
adherents who abdicate agency to authoritarian leaders; and to remove whole groups 
from any connection to the sites and means for effective engagement in identity 
politics (Saliba (1995) summarises these sorts of charges levelled at the 'cults'). 
However, recent studies of groups suspected of having some one, or combination of 
these characteristics show few of them to confirm suspicion. 
For example, recent American (Griffin 1995; Finley 1991; Neitz 1990) and 
Australian (Hume 1997) studies of neo-paganism- the Goddess movement and Wicca 
in particular - show how they provide orientations, dispositions and empowerment 
for effective engagement in identity politics. Acknowledging differences between 
diverse strands of these religions, these studies draw out some common characteristics, 
including a monistic world view which locates the sacred in nature, and the good in 
the restoration of harmonious relationships between the sacred cosmos and 
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humankind. At the same time, the religions are strongly antinomian: authority is 
found only in the freely questing, experimenting, dogma-rejecting self, and external 
authority, particularly of the patriarchal kind, is rejected. In pagan rituals the 
enactment of fantasies appears to stimulate the imagination of new forms of social 
life and ~ew ways of living in harmony with nature. The combination of monism, 
antinomian tendencies and enacted fantasy disposes devotees to 'continual dialectic' 
well beyond the narrow confines of the religious group (Hume 1997 :229), and thereby, 
to creative engagement in the environmental and women's movements. Just as 
common tendencies in these neo-pagan religions orientate and dispose devotees to 
action in such social movements, so they empower, women especially, for effective 
action (Finley 1991). Then, the low boundaries of most neo-pagan groups and 
networking between them appears to provide at once sufficient community for the 
development and maintenance of distinct identity, and sufficient connection with 
the mainstream to allow for effective political activism (Griffin 1995). 
This brief consideration of claims advanced in studies of neo-pagan religions 
as compared to stereotyping claims made about the new religious movements and 
the 'cults' as nihilistic and disintegrative leads us to appreciate the need to construct 
societal profiles of the range of new religions as an essential step in understanding 
how they may figure in the transformation of whole societies. It also provides some 
leads about the components of such profiles. If we are to understand how the new 
religions are involved (or detached from) democratic identity politics in Australia, 
we need evidence about their basic focus, the locus of their religious work, how they 
dispose devotees towards the world, what sorts of boundaries their constituent groups 
construct, and whether their form of association allows at once the nurturing of 
difference within religious community and the engagements of identity politics beyond 
it. Combining insights from studies of the new religions with concepts and typologies 
long since developed in the sociology of religion (e.g. by Weber (1958a) forreligious 
orientations and by Bainbridge and Stark (1980) for religious groups), the following 
grid for the construction of societal profiles of religious groups is proposed. 
Societal Profile Grid 
1. Religious orientations affecting dispositions and capacities to engage in identity 
politics. 
1.1 Basic focus and preoccupation 
self 
religious group 
society 
alternative or other worldly reality or divinity. 
1.2 Locus of religious work 
daily life world 
secluded, monastic or semi-monastic 
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1.3 Type and locus of religious aspiration 
this-worldly functional adjustment 
this-worldly transformational 
other-worldly accretional 
other-worldly apocalyptic 
2. Type of religious association affecting capacity for effective engagement in 
identity politics. 
2.1 Boundary and boundary behaviour 
low, and casual drift across boundaries 
low, and intentional exchange across boundaries 
high, but bridged 
high, and unbridged 
2.2 Form of association 
loose network 
commercial staff-client 
communal 
leader-focussed sect 
The first set of types in the grid proposes to include the vast range of religious 
orientations found among the new religions which appear to affect dispositions and 
capacities to engage in identity politics. All three typologies are elaborations of 
types of religious orientations proposed by Max Weber (1958a, 1963) in his attempts 
to understand connections between different religious cultures, practical ethics, and 
the course of societal development. Types 1.1, basic focus and preoccupation, are 
formulated not only with Weber's categories of inner-worldly and other-worldly 
orientation in mind, but with an eye to an initial, simplistic working hypothesis that 
exclusive basic focus on self or religious group or some other worldly reality -
orientations actually found among the new religions -will deflect groups and devotees 
away from the engagements of identity politics, and that, conversely, a focus on 
society, or on changing social structures or lifestyles will foster such engagement. 
Most of the new religions considered here do indeed represent themselves or 
are represented as religions of the self: they focus on and are preoccupied with the 
self as source of authority and are religions for the self in the sense that they enjoin 
work on the inner self to achieve meaning, a sense of well-being, salvation in the 
next life or satisfaction in this. Paul Heelas (1993) characterises New Age religion 
as "self religiosity" in these senses. Therapeutic religions like the Church of 
Scientology and spiritual Yoga groups like the 3HO Foundation which work primarily 
on the inner self are also religions of self-orientation. 
But classification under this heading is not easy. Many religions of the self 
also have a strong secondary focus on society, or seek to transform society or the 
world at large by working on the self in the first instance. The Sathya Sai organisation 
of Australia represents itself as 'a non sectarian spiritual organisation' 3 (Directory: 
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121). It is one of the twentieth century Indian religions that spread around the world 
in the1960s, arriving in Australia in the 1970s, and now claims over a hundred 
centres in this country and about 5000 members. It urges constant work for the 
disciplining of the self, but the end is not only self-improvement but the acquirement 
of strength and energy for the service of society. An even more recent arrival from 
India, Sahaja Yoga similarly urges working on the self for 'self-realisation' but 
especially in the context of the family, so to engender compassionate understanding 
of the world's problems and acquire the energies to address them. Of entirely different 
provenance, the pagan Goddess and Earth worshipping Church of All Worlds, formed 
in Australia in 1992, celebrates the authority of the self and "the realisation of ultimate 
individual freedom and personal responsibility" - but all this "in harmonious eco-
psychic relationship with the total Biosphere of Holy Mother Earth" (Directory: 31). 
Focus on the 'self' for these pagans is meant to issue in new collective orientations 
towards sustainable development of the biosphere. 
Similarly, basic focus on supernatural reality, or beings not of this world is not 
always exclusive focus in the sense that it precludes any engagements in this-worldly 
matters. There are instances of new religions which do appear to foster exclusive 
other-worldly focus - the infamous case of the Heaven's Gate, for instance. But 
groups like the Children of God and ISKON (Hare Krishnas ), though in their different 
ways focussing mainly on the transcendent and on withdrawal from the world with 
a focus on the religious community itself, are also disposed to the provision of services 
to the world outside the community, and to forms of working in and on the world. 
Max Weber's (1958c) account of the 'elective affinity' between the Calvinist 
Protestant ethic and early modern capitalism demonstrated the importance of the 
two further aspects of religious orientations in the grid (1.2 and 1.3). Lived Calvinism, 
the Calvinist identity movement as we might now call it rather than the Calvinism 
of the theologians, had an enormous impact on the the political economic history of 
the West, in Weber's view, because it located the signs of salvation and work for the 
glory of God in the world of daily life rather than in monastic seclusion from the 
world. Furthermore, that work in the world embodied projects at odds with prevailing 
economic, political and cultural mores. Just as much as such work was intended to 
achieve the signs of salvation, the Puritan aspiration was also to transform daily life, 
its social relations and lifestyles, to correspond with a Puritan imagination, inflected 
with this-worldly asceticism. The tension in the basic focus between sinful self and 
inscrutable, demanding and predestining God, and the resolution of this tension in 
work in and on this world, produced the dynamics of an historically effective religious 
movement. 
In the "world without spirit" (Weber 1958c:180-182) that is our world, the 
force of the Puritan religious movement long spent, it is nonetheless a fair working 
hypothesis that the basic dynamics of that movement will still operate. The new 
religions that orientate devotees to action in daily life, with the aspiration to transform 
it, we might expect, are potential identity movements or, like some of the pagan 
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groups, part of more broadly based identity movements. These are religions that 
locate religious work in the daily life world rather than in monastic seclusion (1.2), 
and that at the same time, aspire to transform the world rather than adjust to it. 
Paul Heelas (1993) describes a stream of New Age that is indeed orientated to 
this world but has no transformational edge, precisely because it fosters adjustment 
and aspires to hone skills for fuller, successful engagement in contemporary corporate 
business life. However, there are many new religions which are decidedly this-worldly 
in their location of religious work and aspire to transform the world rather than 
adjust to it. Many elements of the Pan-Pacific Pagan Alliance appear to be of this 
orientation, as are the Ramakrishna Vedanta Society, Sahaja Yoga, Sokka Gakkai 
International, Sri Chinmoy, and many other groups. 
On the other hand, some of the new religions locate religious work in large 
part in seclusion from everyday life, and aspire either to build up merit for a life to 
come (other worldly accretional) or to prepare to be survivors for that better mode of 
existence that is shortly to erupt into the everyday world (other worldly apocalyptic). 
Religions fostering these orientations steer members away from any collective action 
to engage with and transform the prevailing social order and cultural mores in favour 
of preparation for the better life to come. Some other-worldly religions present 
themselves as having both accretional and apocalyptic or survivalist tendencies. An 
example of this is the Church Universal and Triumphant (the Summit Lighthouse), 
which came to Australia from the U.S.A. in 1978 and now has seven main centres 
and several smaller ones around Australia. The Church indicates that its primary 
purpose is the publication and dissemination of the teaching of the Ascended Masters 
- including Jesus Christ, Mother Mary, Moses, Zarathustra and Gautama Buddha. 
The teachings and practices promoted by the Church are meant to help adherents 
achieve progress through prayer and meditation in a series of incarnations towards 
the goal of Ascension and reunion of the soul with God (Directory:43-4). This 
orientation is not necessarily to be realised in radical seclusion from the world, and 
does not preclude service to the world. But the primary orientations and aspirations 
are clearly other-worldly directed, and the present Messenger of the Church has 
made pronouncements of imminent apocalypse in the recent past, urging preparations 
for survival. 
Location of a religion according to the religious orientations it fosters is not 
all there is to a societal profile. Characteristics of the religious group itself, its form 
of association, also bear on the capacity of members of the religion to engage effectively 
in identity politics. In the grid (2.1) the first set of types of form of association refers 
to boundary and boundary behaviour. Many of the new religious groups have high 
boundaries, symbolic fences, and in a very few cases physical constraints, separating 
insiders from outsiders. By and large, groups with high, firm boundaries are also 
basically focussed on the group itself and aspire to achieve this- or other-worldly 
goals for members only. They are not disposed and do not dispose to engagement in 
the exchanges of identity politics. Examples of new religions with relatively high 
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boundaries are Amanda Marga, the Children of God, the Unification Church (the 
Mooonies), ISKON and Subud, and the core elements of the Church of Scientology 
and the Temple of Set. 
But consideration of even this short list alerts us to two further characteristics 
of religious groups. First, these groups, like most new immigrant and ethnic 
community religions (NIECs), though they might have high boundaries, vary in 
behaviour around those boundaries; and boundary behaviour affects capacities and 
dispositions to engage in identity politics. Second, height and tightness of boundary 
is a subtle variable in its connection to capacity for engagement in identity politics. 
The boundary of a given religious association may be so low and loose that there is 
insufficient density and stability of exchanges between members to build and sustain 
particular identity. This (to a complete outsider at any rate) appears to be the case 
with such religions and the Church of All Worlds, several of the Yoga spiritual 
groups, or groups like the Sydney Goodwill Unit of Service. But just how high and 
tight boundary must be to allow sufficient .density of exchange without entailing 
closure from the contacts and engagements judged necessary for effective entry into 
identity politics, cannot be specified here: this is an issue that awaits careful empirical 
research. 
Boundary behaviour- particularly the extent to which groups allow or encourage 
'bridging' across boundaries and enter into or disallow alliances with other groups 
- has emerged in recent American and Australian studies as an important variable 
in connection with matters under discussion here. Examination of boundary behaviour 
is especially important in the case of just those high boundary groups which foster 
particularistic, out-of-the-mainstream identities (including some NIEC religious 
groups) which, as they proliferate, give rise to the fear of the tribalisation and 
fragmentation of society, in Australia as much as in the U.S. Bouma (1996:104-5) 
suggests that at least some groups of that kind will enter into pragmatic alliances 
and pursue survival strategies which involve social and political engagement, thus, 
arguably, enriching civil society and facilitating the engagement of members in 
identity politics. Warner (1997), addressing our broad question in the case of the 
US, argues against those who fear that proliferating new immigrant and ethnic 
congregations pose a threat to American universalism. On the basis of ritual practices 
he has observed in these groups across America, he finds that particularist difference 
is established in these rituals, but so are 'bridges' intentionally extended across the 
religious group boundaries. Warner sees signs of the construction of "a society with 
a multitude of particular communities but also with multiple bridges between them" 
(Warner 1997:223). 
Whether such bridges are effective in enabling groups and members of a given 
religion to engage in identity politics will further depend on its form of association 
(2.2). A small number of the new religions have the form of loose networks, without 
hierarchy, permanent staff or strong central administration. Their members are linked 
only by fairly shallow and impermanent ties and the network itself is not dense or 
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stable, approaching the bund or 'communion' described by Hetherington (1992:93) 
as a "small scale, achieved rather than ascribed, unstable and affectual form of 
association ... highly self-referential". Short of this extreme, the Australian 
Transmission Meditation Network takes the form of such a loose network. A much 
greater number of the new religions combine a loose network form for members 
who relate mostly as individuals to a commercially organised core. None of the new 
religions represent themselves as having a purely commercial form of organisation, 
the second of the four types listed under 2.2. But examples of the mixed type include 
the Brahma Kumaris Raja Yoga centres, Sokka Gakkai and the Synchronicity 
Foundation. This mixed form may be exemplified by the latter instance. 
Synchronicity was founded in Virginia U.S.A by Master Charles in 1982 and is a 
non-profit incorporated foundation. Its stated purpose is to share and further "the 
Source Conscious experience and Source Conscious living through the art and science 
of meditation" (Directory: 150). Its primary focus is High-Tech meditation. It lists 
as its sources of finance the sale of meditation tapes and compensation fees for High 
Tech Meditation Counselling. 
A third form of association is the communal, and it is this type which is most 
likely to nurture the proclivities and abilities for effective engagement in identity c:' 
politics, provided bridges linking the community to the wider society are maintained 
and sustain two-way traffic. The loose, relatively unstable network, as already 
suggested, will not sustain the collective action of identity politics because it is a 
form of association unsuited to the cultivation and internal negotiation of 
particularistic, distinctive identity and leaves individual members vulnerable to the 
shifting flows of alternative identities in contemporary consumer societies. By 
contrast, communal associations foster internally, multifaceted, dense and sustained 
engagements among persons who bring their otherness as well as their shared 
identities to the community (Milbank 1996). It is proposed as a working hypothesis 
that the internal dialogue and mediation of difference in communal associations 
disposes and equips members for external engagements in identity politics. Some 
ISKON centres appear to approach this ideal type of community, though, as noted 
by Rochford (1995) ISKON tends now to combine a predominant loose boundary, 
denominational form with small core communal associations. Several other new 
religions likewise combine core communal associations with another form of 
association, usually of the loose network kind, for ordinary members. Ananda Marga, 
the Buddhist Society of Victoria, The Church Universal and Triumphant and Sathya 
Sai all display this sort of combined form of association. 
The fourth form of association, the leader-focussed sect is not nearly as common 
as the anti-cult literature would have it. However, there are leader focussed religious 
associations among the new religions and in recent developments in some older 
traditions. The Branch Davidians of Waco led by David Koresh was an example of 
the latter. At one point in their history, but certainly not now, the Children of God 
under the inspiration and leadership of David Berg, were of this type. The Raelians, 
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led by 'Rael' (Claude Vorilhon) appear to be highly leader-focussed in their one-
way leader to member flow of communications within closed high boundary groups. 
It is unlikely that such leader-focussed sects equip individual members or groups for 
effective identity politics engagements. The argument in support of this working 
hypothesis takes off from differences between the leader-focussed sect and communal 
or combined communal associations. The latter allow the fluid yet functional forms 
of trust and solidarity which Jon P. Bloch (1998) argues are necessary if the cultivation 
of difference and the "spirit of negotiation" are to be developed together in a group. 
But in the leader-focussed sect, the flow of new information is centrally controlled 
and never negotiated by group members; there is no fluidity in the relationships of 
trust which are, in any case, forged only between the leader and individual members, 
rather than between members who are also engaged in the negotiation of their 
identities inside and outside the group. If Bloch is right, the form of association in 
the small number of new religions that are exclusively leader-focussed disables both 
group and its members for effective engagement in identity politics at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
Conclusions 
This paper stops short of the next two steps in the investigation of connections 
between religious diversity and the development of Australian society through the 
democratic negotiation of distinctive religious identities. The necessary steps taken 
here have been to assemble and discuss the elements of the societal profiles of the 
new religions; and to illustrate how the new religions actually vary enormously in 
the orientations that affect dispositions to engage in the democratic negotiation of 
religious identity, as well as in the associational forms that bear on effective identity 
formation on the one hand, and empowerment for effective engagement in identity 
politics on the other. On the way, a number of working hypotheses have been outlined, 
explaining how particular types listed in the grid of societal profile elements affect 
dispositions and effectiveness. 
The next two steps would be first, to construct and present the full societal 
profiles of as many as possible of the new religions, and indeed of the whole array of 
elements in Australia's increasing religious diversity including the NIEC 
congregations and new fundamentalist groups in established traditions. Second, the 
working hypotheses would be tested. These steps cannot be taken as yet because the 
evidence is not in. The evidence drawn on for the first steps reported here is too 
superficial and incomplete to rely on for the next steps. It comes from data gathered 
for a directory of new religious associations which was provided by some fifty-nine 
associations responding to a questionnaire asking them to summarise main beliefs 
and values as well as provide details of organizational structure, function and history. 
The self-representations in response to a minimalist questionnaire require 
amplification and checking before the associations can be confidently placed 
according to types in the grid and reliable societal profiles assembled. Further, reading 
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across the grid placements towards an understanding of the experience and 
implications of the new religion in the lives of members requires consideration of 
additional evidence from observation of the religious life of the group and in-depth 
biographical interviews with members themselves; and that research has still to be 
done for almost all the entries in the Directory. 
However, short of fully reliable societal profiles and testing of working 
hypotheses, some patterns emerging out of tentative placing of the fifty-nine new 
religious associations can be noted. Further, and finally, these patterns may be drawn 
on to inform conclusions, admittedly speculative, about the sort of Australia that is 
at once revealed and constructed in the array of new religions. 
When the grid placements of the fifty-nine associations were assembled on 
one chart, several features were easily observable. The first feature, as might be 
anticipated from the discussion of the grid typologies, is the variability of the new 
religious groups. There are indeed religions with profiles which appear to vindicate 
the fears and suspicions of a James Kurth: religions which orientate members away 
from the engagements of the good citizen of modernity, and wall them off from the 
polluting world of modem everyday life, thereby aiding and abetting processes 
supposedly leading to the fragmentation of society into mutually hostile tribal groups. 
These are the religions with a fragmentation profile. Curiously enough, though, a 
few new religions have societal profiles which suggest they are restorationist, i.e., 
they are capably about the business of restoring the sort of society whose passing 
Kurth laments. They urge the renewal of traditional family values, connect personal 
growth to civic action, and preach and practice bridging across multicultural divides; 
and they have the sort of communal structure, at least for core members, which 
would appear to facilitate socialisation into the key orientations and values of the 
religion, while providing at least symbolic bridges to the 'outside'. The Unification 
Church has this restorationist profile. Another set of religions shares a very different 
profile which is called here the market profile: focus on self, location of religious 
work in the daily life world, aspiration to functional adjustment to the demands of 
market competition, and low boundary association in which the salient relationships 
are of the commercial staff to client type. Religions with this profile, lacking 
orientations to collective action and without the associational means to nurture and 
sustain distinctive identity, are not expected to produce citizens either for the 'old' 
democracy of national state politics or the 'new' democracy of social movement 
identity politics. 
However, the second notable feature of the chart is that among all the variation, 
the largest set of new religions shares the sort of profile which, according to our 
working hypotheses, may dispose and equip members for effective engagement in 
identity politics. This profile, called here the movement profile includes the following 
orientational elements: a dual focus on self and society, this-worldly location of 
religious work, and the aspiration to transform rather than adjust to the social and/ 
or cultural status quo. In associational form the religions with these orientational 
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features diverge into sub-sets: low boundary with easy drift and a loose network 
without a communal core on the one hand, and higher but bridged boundary with a 
communal core on the other. It is the latter, less frequent subtype, exemplified 
tentatively by such associations as ISKON, Sahaja Yoga, Sri Chinmoy, Sukyo 
Mahikari, and some of the groups within the Pagan Pacific Alliance, which is expected 
to maximise collective and individual effectiveness in the engagements of identity 
politics. 
In the absence of further research, it is neither proper nor useful to list 
exhaustively the new religions according to type of societal profile; and it is premature 
to count the number of associations falling into each type, given the tentativeness of 
the classifications. But some conclusions drawn from the attempt at tentative 
classifications are worth presenting. First and most obviously, the range of profoundly 
different profiles shows that it is absurd to posit some single societal significance or 
impact of the new religions considered here, still less of the whole array of elements 
in Australia's religious diversity. Profiling and the typing of profiles so far suggests 
that while some few of the new religions may signify and even help produce (as bit-
players, given their small size) a measure of disintegration of national society as 
imagined in the 1950s, others orientate and equip members to restore that imagined 
society. Some ofthe new religions encapsulate adherents in separate religious worlds 
that, in the short haul at least, appear not to articulate with the dynamics of social 
and cultural change, while others are contributing soul and energy to the new social 
movements. 
Less obviously, the exercise in typing and classifying, albeit crude so far, helps 
us locate the new religions in the several different emergent Australias that the new 
macro-sociology, briefly reviewed above, helps us to discern and describe. The first 
of these is pure global market Australia. In the already prefigured future for this 
Australia, national society has indeed been subverted as politicians dismantle national 
institutions of production, distribution and accountability in favour of free market 
flows. The publics comprising civil society have shrunk as they have less and less to 
offer by way of symbolic or material goods to erstwhile participating citizens. These 
become fewer in populations of competing individual consumers of globally 
circulating symbolic and material goods.· It seems reasonable to claim that the new 
religions with a market profile (tentatively including 3HO and Synchronicity 
Foundation Inc.) have what Weber called an 'elective affinity' with this emergent 
pure global market Australia. Put simply, this Australia is good for market-profile 
religion, and that religion is good for global market Australia as it jostles with other 
emergent Australias to attain its pure form. 
The second emergent Australia is pure modern industrial Australia. Though 
this Australia may well have been closest to pure form in the fifth and sixth decades 
of this century, many of the public and private institutions survive, and the 
orientations, norms and values consonant with these institutions are upheld by large 
constituencies. The restorationist new religions, arguably, have an elective affinity 
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with this fading modern industrial order, joining sections of the established Christian 
churches and some of the Pentecostal congregations in its maintenance and 
restoration. 
The third of the emergent Australias is pure technocracy Australia. We can 
already see this Australia in which ordinary citizens go about their everyday lives 
worked on but unable to work the political economy which rules over them according 
to the abstracted imperatives of technical rationality as administered by technocratic 
elites. In its fully realised pure form, resistant groups, some religiously inspired, 
might still be found but only as 'isolated utopias' in an Australian society conquered 
by technocracy. A subtype of the religions with market profiles will prosper in this 
Australia which they have had a small part in producing and sustaining: these are 
new religions like Synchronicity that find the pathway to the sacred and perhaps the 
sacred itself in a virtual reality that is accessible and attractive mainly to techno 
elites. It is probable that the input of such new religions to the progress of pure 
technocracy Australia is nowhere as great as certain developments in established 
religions, like Roman Catholicism's Opus Dei which appears very directly to foster 
and sacralise technocratic elitism. 
Fourth is pure tribalised Australia . This is Australian society that has 
decomposed into mutually hostile fiefdoms or tribes formed around various principles 
of collective identity. The tribes of emergent tribalised Australia are of various kinds. 
Some are unstable groups of individuals temporarily sharing a lifestyle option or a 
therapy or a drug. Others are more stable but erect high boundaries behind which 
they go on strike from what remains of civil society and retreat from contact with 
other tribes. This emergent Australia is prefigured, though not exclusively so, in a 
few religious associations with fragmentation profiles. 
Finally there is enriched civil society Australia. This is Australian civil 
society fighting back against colonisation and fragmentation by the forces of 
technocratic rationality and the individualising market. In this Australia, resistant 
movements (green, feminist) talk with one another, engage with the political economic 
elites, and win back territory for the exercise of citizenship and the slow creation of 
a renewed Australian 'vernacular republic'. Some of the new religious groups, 
those with the movement profile, already appear to add, dare we say, soul, to these 
movements. Insofar as these groups communicate with one another and articulate 
to an emerging new Australia through the social movements, they may be constructing 
an Australian community of communities. 
This exercise in putting the new religious associations, important elements in 
Australia's increasing religious diversity, back into the various emergent Australias, 
is at this point highly speculative: an exercise of the sociological imagination awaiting 
hard, testing evidence. Nonetheless, it does help us draw some conclusions about 
the management of religious diversity in Australian society. If that means somehow 
controlling or even culling of diversity in the name of national integration, then 
management should be abandoned as counter productive. If Australian society ever 
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was integrated under a sacred canopy buttressed by the established religions (in 
itself a debatable proposition) it is certainly not that at the end of the twentieth 
century. At century's end Australian society can only be conceptualised as a jostling, 
competing set of projects, or imagined and already emergent futures, some more 
democratic and autonomous in global society than others. 
This inescapably multicultural Australia is integrated only insofar as its 
constituent elements engage with one another in the mediation of difference through 
institutions of mediation and through a range of social movements. A first attempt 
to construct the societal profiles of new religious associations in Australia indicates 
that in their great variation, types of profiles are discemable. Each of these types 
appears to have an affinity with one or another of the emergent Australias. More 
important, a significant proportion of new religious associations, along with some 
of the older associations, appear to have profiles indicating that they dispose and 
enable engagement in the mediation of difference- what is called here identity politics. 
In other words, elements in Australia's religious diversity may well be sources of a 
new form of societal integration rather than subversive of it, and contributors to 
renewed democracy in a maximally autonomous Australian society within global 
society. If religious diversity is to be managed at all, it must surely be in the direction 
of encouraging it, and maximising dialogue and exchanges between its constituent 
elements. 
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Endnotes 
1. See James Kurth, 'The Post-modem State', The National Interest, Summer 1992, 26-36. 
2. Kurth and a range of quite secular conservative social commentators in the U.S. join with 
the religious fundamentalists in another way, in Connolly's view. Both speak the language of 
nationalist fundamentalism which asserts that the state represents the highest point of political 
obligation and loyalty for every citizen. 
3. This and quoted self-representations of other new religious groups in this paper are drawn 
from a Directory of New Religious Associations which I have compiled. New Religious 
Associations were asked to complete a questionnaire and provide information of main beliefs 
and practices, as well as details about organizational structures. At this point, the Directory 
includes entries for fifty-nine religious associations. It is so far unpublished but is cited 
henceforward simply as Directory. 
